as to the circumstances of his having fallen so low, he told me the following. The Emir was once playing chess in his presence with one of his begs, and at a critical point, after long reflection, he made a decisive move and then turned, self-satisfied to the favorite to ask if he thought the play a good one. The latter answered truthfully that he could consider the move only as an unlucky one, and the result immediately showed that he had not been deceived, for the Emir lost the game after only two more moves. The Emir was so exasperated by the frankness of his chess adviser as well as at the loss of the game that he dismissed the man then and there, and confiscated all his property. Since naturally all the others turned their backs on the Emir's abandoned favorite, whose favor they had courted until that time, there was nothing left for the unlucky chess master but to beg for his bread. 643 558

The willfulness with which the Central Asian khans have always treated all their subjects, without regard to person, is only somewhat mitigated by their constant fear of revolts and assassination. The last Khan of Kokand, Khudoyar, was driven from the land by his subjects three times. The grandfather of the present Emir of Bukhara, Nasr Allah, who was finally also done away with by his favorite wife, lived in constant fear of death after he himself had murdered all his brothers, and he had recourse to extensive precautionary measures to ensure himself against poisoners. His drinking water had to be brought directly from the Zerafshan and inspected and sealed by two court officials and each time it had to be tasted first by the Kushbegi and his servants before the Emir himself decided to drink it. The food intended for the Emir was prepared not in his own harem but in the harem of these same officials and under their inspection. Of the finished dishes the Kushbegi and his followers always ate first, and only if there were no signs of poisoning among them after the passage of an hour, the food would be sent over to the Emir in a closed, sealed chest. The same procedure was followed with the fruit brought to the table of the Emir. Nasr Allah trusted his own sons so little that he always forced them to leave the capital whenever he changed his residence to Samarkand for the summer, so that they might not bring about some sort of revolt in his absence. 643 [669]

/177/ As for political organization in the Central Asian khanates, it is distinguished by extensive decentralization. Government officials, whose sphere of activity extends over the entire state, on the whole do not exist. The khan rules directly only that town in which he resides; here he collects taxes, appoints the administrative officials 631

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advancing his successes on the Afghan frontier, and might even take him on to Herat. And, above all, it would enable him, from Transcaspia, to reach out to the heart of the country in Tashkent and Farghana. It would provide the rapid transport needed for supplying the farther outposts of the empire in Central Asia. As Curzon said — with the successes of Skobelev Transcaspia threw down her challenge to Turkistan.[1]

It is worth stressing the energy that the Russians put into railway construction in this area in the time of the Tsars.[2] For not only were the two main lines, the Trans-Caspian and the so-called Trans-Aral Railways, in being by 1906, but the Tsars had already proceeded far in the survey of the trunk now known as the Turk-Sib to join the Central Asian railways with Siberia by means of a line from Aris, near Chimkent, passing through Semipalatinsk to meet the Siberian Railway at Novosibirsk in the Kuzbas. Five-year plans seldom give credit for the actual work, or the preliminary survey, carried through by the régime which preceded them. The Turk-Sib is an instance of this tendency. Much advertised as a triumph of Soviet engineering, it was in fact completed not before 1930 on the basis of preparatory work carried out many years before under the Tsars. We shall see later that, in comparison with the pioneer work done in earlier times, railway construction by the Soviets in Central Asia has lagged behind.

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It remains to record two scenes in the act which closes when the curtain of the Russian Revolution drops over Central Asia.

The first of these was the rebellion in Farghana in 1898, known as the revolt of Dūkchi Ishan. Dūkchi Ishan was a village priest in the countryside near Andijan. His knowledge of theology was small, but he had a winning tongue and a strong faith both in his Islamic tenets and in the destiny of his people. There is a picture of him in Castagné's *Les Bas-*

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 293. [2] Cf. sketch map, Chapter XII, facing p. 192.

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matchis, a benign figure, heavily bearded and of a dark complexion, with big capable hands upon his knees, a typical *imam* of the old school, like many whose names have become household words among the Pathan tribes of the North-West Frontier. He was a curious mixture of Gandhi and St. Paul. A maker of ropes and tents whose purity and faith won the people's affection, he built his house upon a hill. Here he planted trees and made the hill blossom by carrying up water which he gave indiscriminately to his garden and to the thirsty wayfarer. Asked why he consorted with the poor, he replied that he had no trust in the well-to-do, and it was for a man to seek those like him and befriend those who draw near to him.

His following was composed of hill Kazaks and Kirghiz around the Narin displaced by Russian immigrants, and bankrupt farmers overtaken by a cotton slump. There was a sudden agrarian revolt by peasants and herdsmen often armed only with spades and pitchforks. They set the shaikh on a white horse and, proclaiming him as their Khan, attacked the barracks outside Andijan and massacred a number of troops.

Of course in Russia the revolt was crushed by troops, and its leader put to death. But nothing was done to ascertain the causes of it or to take measures which would remove the underlying discontent. Property became concentrated in official hands; poverty and crime increased. The province of Farghana became in Turkistan what Peshawar once was in India and that not only in its physical contours; its tale of violent crime was greater than that of any part of the Russian Empire. The fuse had been laid for the Basmachi rebellion of later years.

The second revolt was the immediate precursor of the Revolution itself, and broke out in 1916. It was directed against the Tsarist order calling up the people for non-combatant military service in World War I, and was known as the *Merdikar*[1] Revolt. Togan says that ostensibly as an

[1] The word means 'man of work' in Persian. The suggestion is that it was used in the sense of conscript labour. Is it not possible that it was a slogan, 'Man of action', used by the rebels themselves?

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act of grace, but really because the Russians had been alarmed by the prowess of Kine Sari and his like, the tribes of Turkistan had been exempted from military service, and, in his view foolishly, regarded this as a privilege. Foolishly, because this charter did not exempt them from confiscations and plunder in kind, and, in any case, the exemption was in the end withdrawn. The Tsar's order directing mobilization of all males between 19 and 43 was regarded as the fatal and final spark which led to a general explosion.

The Kipchaks of the Kazak steppe came into prominence again under a leader Abdul Ghaffar, who for a short time succeeded in reviving the enthusiasms of the days of Kine Sari, eighty years before. There were sporadic revolts also in Farghana and the rest of the Uzbek country down the Amu as far as Khiva, and small bodies of Russian troops or colonists were murdered wherever found. The action taken in reprisal by the last Governor-General, Kuropatkin, was in the tradition of Skobelev, whose pupil he was, thousands of tribesmen being exterminated or driven into the wastes to die. There is no doubt that the strenuous military effort required of the Tsar's government to crush this rebellion at a time when Russia was at the crisis of her great struggle with Germany and Austria affected the course of the War. Internally, too, it may even be said that the diversion of troops was in itself a contributory cause of the fall of the Tsar and the success of the revolutionaries.

In the earlier years of the Soviet régime, when lip service was still paid to nationalism, it was fashionable for Soviet writers to refer with enthusiastic approval to these nationalist movements of the pre-revolutionary era.[1] Even the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* in its first edition commended them as risings of the workers against the oppression of the Tsar's government. But this attitude is now condemned as a distortion, false coin to be withdrawn from circulation in common with the edition of the encyclopedia which gave it currency. These movements are now represented as reactionary risings of the feudal classes, dissatisfied by the diminution of the

[1] [illegible] of 1898 and 1916; see cat. 116, pp. 88–90 — Ed.

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power of the Khans and clergy. Because it is true that the Dükchi Ishan movement in particular was to some extent a reaction inspired by the Turkic and Islamic traditions of the Farghana Valley, Soviet critics single it out for special castigation on the ground that its leaders aimed at the severance of the peoples of Central Asia from Russia and the Great Russian people — an aim which official teaching now proclaims to have been without validity even in Tsarist times. We shall observe later the development in Soviet hands of a first principle of historical dialectics,[1] designed and applied to establish that Tsarist conquests and suppressions of local nationalism were but the first and right stage in a process leading inevitably to the present Soviet national policy.

As the year 1917 went by, the rebellion was succeeded by widespread famine. The economy of Turkistan, exporting cotton for grain, was brittle in the extreme. World war and local revolt had together produced a situation in which most of the surplus grain was wanted to feed the armies on the Western front and even that which was left over could not be carried to Turkistan along railways that were cut and disorganized. It was not surprising that the brighter spirits among the more educated Turks in Central Asia denounced this revolt as wasted effort and after the October Revolution looked for kindred spirits among the Bolsheviks who would advance the cause of the freedom of the peoples of Turkistan.

And so, heralded by massacre and famine, looms up the Soviet era in this homeland of the Turks. The Tsars in their time had done little to lift the curtain from a country that a long isolation had made mysterious. It was as if, inheriting the jealous exclusiveness of the Emirs before them, they had something serious to conceal. But in 1917 it seemed that the barriers were at last about to fall.

[1] Known as the Conception of the Lesser Evil. See pp. 231-2.

[pages 92, 93, 94 = blank]

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any authority offering them protection against the indigenous population. Some of them joined the Mensheviks and there was intensive murder and counter-murder between Menshevik and Bolshevik on this as on other stages. But, perhaps because of the greater Bolshevik aptitude in the making of fair promises (however belied in ruthless action), it was he who in the end prevailed with the Russians in Central Asia. Thus the nationalists among the Eastern Turks found their separatist aspirations in basic conflict with those of the provincial Bolsheviks.

The actual events which took place in Central Asia between the February[1] (Kerensky) Revolution of 1917 and the death of Enver Pasha in August 1922 are so confused that a clear disentanglement is hard to make. The cross-currents were many, one of the most troublesome being the spate of political manifestos issued by the many mushroom organizations, both Russian and Turkish, during this period. Moreover, the continuous rewriting of history within the Soviet Union to fit each new adjustment of the Party line means that the Russian historians are more or less valueless whether as guides to fact or as delineators of perspective. Togan does at least give us a narrative of a succession of personal experiences over a very wide field, for he travelled during those years over the whole country between the Urals and the Afghan frontier, he enjoyed intimate talks with Lenin and Stalin, he was a confidant of Enver Pasha, and finally he was closely concerned with the Basmachi movement. Perhaps most interesting of all, he was the mainspring of the Bashkurd government, which almost alone among the short-lived growths of those times took practical steps towards the creation of a military force, so compelling even Lenin and Stalin to take account of and temporize with its leaders.

It is only possible to find a way through this maze if it is understood that the main forces operating among the Eastern

[1] According to the Julian calendar, then in force in Russia, this event took place in the last days of February. The Soviets, having brought the calendar into line, often refer to it as the March Revolution.

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Turks were four, that these forces usually pulled in diverse directions, and that there was no sufficient overriding power to bring them together. The first force was that of the Turkish nobility and gentry, headed by Abdul Said Mir Alim Khan, the last of the Mangit line of the Emirs of Bukhara. The *ulema* or Muslim *religieux*, and the well-to-do merchants, were in general accord with this group, as were also the *kadis* and *begs* (the judges and magistrates in matters of Muslim personal law) and a number of Russian-educated Turks and Tajiks, many of them in subordinate Russian employ. With the exception of some of the more fanatical priests (who turned to the Basmachis), many of these looked to Russia for livelihood and security, and for that reason shunned national enterprise. At a critical moment the Emir refused to commit himself against the Tashkent Bolsheviks who held the key to the failure or success of the Red Revolution in Turkistan, his reason being that the established policy of Bukhara required him to recognize any force representing Moscow or Petersburg as the Russian government. 'He was afraid', says Togan, 'of the shadow of a dead Russian.'[1]

The second force was that of the northern nomads, mainly Kazak and Bashkurd, expropriated from their lands by Russian colonists, bound with loose tribal bonds, and bitter at heart. The Kazaks were ill-organized and had few leaders of more than tribal stature. The Bashkurds, as we shall see, did better. But the Ural steppe and hills did not provide them with sustenance or refuge sufficient to sustain any protracted campaign, the more so since the years of crisis were years of fearful famine brought on by the failure of the grain supply and general disorder.

The third force was that of the Basmachis.[2] Their stamping-ground was in the mountains and glens around the Farghana Valley, breeding a type of tribesman very like the Afridis and Wazirs of the North-West Frontier. These threw up obstinate leaders of great bravery, endurance and resource,

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 373.

[2] The word is usually derived from the Turkish verb *basmak*, to press, tread underfoot, attack, raid. A raider or highwayman.

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able even in times of shortage to retreat to lairs in the hill country less affected by famine than the steppe. Such were Ibrahim Beg, the Uzbek Lakai chief, cunning and bitter, and the gallant Devletmand who fell with Enver at Beljuvan. The Basmachi tribal cohesion was sufficient to enable them to continue as a menace to the Soviets long after the death of Enver Pasha in 1922. Officially, Russia claimed to have extinguished them by 1924, but the spark was constantly lit again, and Ibrahim Beg did not succumb until 1931. There was talk on the Peshawar border of the continuance of the Basmachi movement as late as the time of Hitler's invasion of Russia in 1941, and even today the fire may not be wholly quenched. But the tribal virtues which sustain and prolong such resistance are not those which can supply the sinews of a modern or national State, and Togan's pages are full of the lament that the Basmachi force could only be mobilized in support of a lost cause like that of the Bukhara Emir, breaking in the hands of those whom he calls the intellectuals. That was the tragedy of Enver Pasha.

The fourth force should have bern these very intellectuals (*münevverler*), not those who were in Russian service and sold to Russia, but those who sprang from the oppressed people themselves and might have crystallized their love of liberty into something modern and practical. Ali Khan Bukaikhan among the Kazaks, Chokai in Kokand, Obedullah Khoja in Tashkent, Osman Khoja in Bukhara, Khan Junaid in Khiva, Togan in the Bashkurd country — these were a few who essayed the task. The scales were weighted against them and in the end they failed.

The February Revolution in Russia was hailed with acclaim by these very men. Some of them had had experience in the short-lived Dumas of the Tsars in the first decade of the XXth century, and they were encouraged by the fact that Kerensky himself had grown up in Turkistan, his father being an inspector of Russian schools in that Tsarist province. Various congresses were held, and there was much manœuvring among the native nationals to play off one Russian party

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against another. The Muslims of European Russia did not back up their brethren in Asia. From their headquarters in Kazan they worked for a unitary government of Russia, within which they saw themselves, as close to the centre, occupying positions of great influence; they opposed the majority of the Eastern Turks, who came out with a programme of local autonomy within a federal framework. The real reason for the autonomy movement in Asiatic Russia was the native impulse to obtain power to retrieve the lands forfeited to Russian colonists, and there is a strong impression that Russians of all parties, white, pink or red, realizing this to be the living issue, were only playing for time and determined to prevent the local nationalists from getting effective control of land policy. The autonomists won the day in the Muslim congress at Moscow held in May 1917, but they were beating the air. The months went by in wordy preparations for a Constituent Assembly. Even the Kazaks took to the new ways, holding congresses as in the times of the steppe cavaliers on horseback in the open air, with a fat mare as a rostrum. Meanwhile in Khiva and Bukhara the efforts of the men of new idea were constantly frustrated by the conservative elements behind the Emir and the *ulema* in the south. And all the time famine conditions were growing worse, communications more difficult. In Tashkent, the Bolsheviks — the only purposeful group — played up to Uzbeks and Kazaks alike by professing their horror of Russian land encroachments, and of the failure to bring corn to the stricken land. There was also considerable Bolshevik success in appealing to the intellectuals with natural leanings to the left. It seemed better to work for Russian revolutionaries than for Mullahs and Begs who prayed for the Tsar.

When the October Revolution came, it was the Bolsheviks who succeeded to power in Tashkent in much the same fashion, and adopting much the same tactics, as in Russia itself. Their capture of Tashkent was to prove decisive. They succeeded in holding on to it throughout the troubles, even in the face of a revolt in January 1919 by their own War

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Commissar, a youth of 23 named Ossipov who had been a Tsarist officer and cast in his lot with the Bolsheviks. Deciding the Bolsheviks were too doctrinaire for him, Ossipov turned against them, treacherously summoned their leaders to help him (as he said) suppress a meeting in the barracks, shot the lot, then, after one crowded hour of glorious life in command of the situation, gave away his advantage by getting superbly drunk and decamping with the money in the direction of Ashkabad. All this time the Bolshevik position in Tashkent was extremely precarious. Their communications were broken on both railways, White Russian, Cossack or native autonomies intervened between them and Moscow, the tribes in the hills were in revolt and food was scarce. It is not surprising that they shot all Ossipov's supporters without mercy. What is remarkable is that they successfully held on to their position and, when the tide turned in Russia itself, were thus enabled from Tashkent to reimpose throughout Turkistan the authority which they alone of the revolutionary groups had shown themselves capable of inheriting from imperial Russia. It is interesting that the actual force which pulled them through their crisis was made up largely of Hungarian and Austrian prisoners of war, who gave them loyal service in return for release and food in time of famine.

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At Tashkent the Ossipov incident was the turning-point, and after it the Soviets in Turkistan, though they had anxious times to face against the Basmachis, had overcome the enemy within the gate and gradually strengthened their position. But, to go back, during the whole of 1918 which preceded it the Turkish leaders outside Tashkent had been striving with greater or less success to give effect to the local autonomies which were their dream, and (in addition to Bukhara and Khiva which still existed) had for a short time been able to set up at least the outward forms of three such States, the first at Kokand in Farghana, the second known as Alash Orda in the northern Kazak territory with its focus in Yedisu

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(Semirechye), and the third in the Bashkurd country. During the first few months after the October Revolution, the Cossacks controlled Orenburg (Chkalov), cutting Red communications with Moscow; and after some vicissitudes the Mensheviks held on to the Turkmen country, cutting the railway to Krasnovodsk. The intellectuals therefore had their brief chance. 'Alash Orda' was proclaimed under Ali Khan Bukey Khan on 17th November 1917, the Bashkurd Republic with Togan as its chief inspirer four days later, and the Kokand Republic on 28th November under Mustafa Chokai.

The new State of Kokand lasted only two months, and lacking an army fell in February 1918 to a determined assault by the Bolsheviks under Ossipov — the same man who later raised the storm at Tashkent — launched from the neighbouring town, which at that time, not inappropriately, was named after Skobelev.[1] The Kokand government had been unable even to overwhelm the forty-five Bolshevik soldiers in the Kokand citadel, which held out until relieved by Ossipov. The chief actors fled in all directions. But it was largely the resurrection of a Kokand State for these few weeks that gave shape and inspiration to the Basmachi rebellion which rallied round one Irgesh, the police chief of the short-lived State.

The Alash Orda or Kazak State was never much more than a committee which held congresses and issued manifestos. Its capital was intended to be in the east at Semipalatinsk, but in fact its activities took place at Orenburg (Chkalov), where was also the seat of the Bashkurd government. Alash Orda was unable to organize any real executive power, or to obtain any working agreement with the many thousands of Russian colonists, who were determined not to yield control of Russian immigration or colonies to any Turkish authority.

The Bashkurd State was more of a reality. Its proclamation coincided almost exactly with the well-known Declara-

[1] This town at various times has been known as Yeni (New) Margilan, Skobelev, and Farghana, the present name. The name Farghana confuses it with the whole valley. With the neighbouring town of Margilan it is now the main seat of the Soviet silk industry in Uzbekistan.

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tion of 15th November 1917, signed by Lenin and (even so early) by Stalin also.

The Council of Peoples Commissars [ran the Declaration] has decided to base its work in relation to the nationalities on the following principles:

(1) Equality and sovereignty of the nations of Russia.
(2) The right of the nations of Russia to free self-determination, *including the right to secede and form independent states.* . . .

This Declaration was followed by a manifesto specially addressed to 'All toiling Muhammadans in Russia and in the East', words that would read oddly in *Pravda* today:

Muhammadans of Russia, Tatars of the Volga and the Crimea, Kirghiz[1] and Sarts of Turkistan, Turks and Tatars of Transcaucasia, all those whose mosques and prayer-houses were destroyed and whose religion and customs were trampled upon by the Russian Tsars and tyrants! Henceforth your faith and customs, your national and cultural institutions, are proclaimed free and inviolable. Build up your national life freely and unhindered. This is your right.

It was not surprising that the autonomists believed the golden age for them had dawned. They were soon undeceived. In February 1918, two months after this Declaration of Liberty, the Red Army defeated the Cossack general Dutov and occupied Orenburg. Declaring the Bashkurd government reactionary and nationalistic, the Bolsheviks arrested its members, including 'Velidov', and established a Revolutionary Soviet of Bashkiria, made up of Bashkurds subordinate to the Russian Soviet in the city. The plan was to win over to the Soviet cause the masses of the Ural country. But this Bashkurd Soviet in its turn began to display what would now be called a Tito mentality: for all parties the real political aim in the background was the control of the lands, whether by Bashkurds for their own people, or by Russians for the Russian

[1] Kazaks are probably meant. The Russians used to confuse Kirghiz with Kazaks. At that time there were at least four times as many Kazaks as Kirghiz in Russian Central Asia.

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colonists. Once again there was an interruption. The Russian Whites returned and (in April 1918), driving out the Bolsheviks from Orenburg, freed Togan and the original leaders of the national movement. Before long Togan had organized a number of efficient Bashkurd regiments (the Bashkurds had long enjoyed a special position in the Tsarist army, in which almost alone of Turkish peoples they had always served with distinction), and in this way he displayed a greater awareness than the other autonomists of his time of the essential measures needed to establish a State. These troops proceeded at first to fight for the Whites under Dutov and Kolchak, but soon found that the Right Wing of Russia, though possibly more honest in its statement of policies, was no more ready than the Left to sacrifice the interests of the large Russian colonial populations in the Urals and on the steppe beyond. The Bashkurd leaders were not capable of splitting ideological hairs with Russians; they were nationalists first and every time, and they had a precise aim, namely the control of their ancestral lands and the expulsion of the encroaching Russian colonists. They were in fact ready to mount any bandwagon that promised well, and they turned once more to the Reds when towards the end of 1918 the effort of Kolchak began to flag.

In these negotiations their hands were strengthened by their possession of a military force. Wielding this weapon, they succeeded in extracting from the Soviet leaders in February 1919 an agreement whereby the Bashkurd troops were merged in the Red Army but under their own command, and in return the Soviets recognized the autonomy of Bashkiria which would be governed by a native committee known as the Bashrevcom.

Thus it seemed that, in Bashkiria at least, after an initial setback a great end had been achieved. The agreement had conceded to the Bashkurd autonomists the control of everything within their territory except railroads, factories and mines, which were to remain under the All-Russian Commissariat. This was a far-reaching concession on the Soviet

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side, and one that seemed to give way on the point of supreme importance to the Bashkurds, that of the disposal of their lands. But once more the native leaders had grasped the shadow only to lose the substance, and the Soviets knew what they were about. It is surprising that Togan, himself the main organizer of the Bashkurd Army, should have handed the only effective force in Turkish hands on a plate to a set of Bolshevik revolutionaries fighting desperately for their own survival. Again and again he says he could not trust them, yet here he gave away the only real card he ever had. It is a proof, if proof were needed, how bemused were the rising intellectuals among the Turks by the catchwords and slogans of the revolutionaries of the time.

Togan himself went with his troops to the Red Army. In Orenburg the Bashkurd leaders, once in the saddle, embarked on an attempt to realize their programme for the compulsory expropriation of all the Russian colonists in Bashkiria. They strove at the same time to aid in the formation of a real Alash Orda state in Kazakistan, but the number of Russian colonists on the steppe was far too large to allow of the establishment by the Kazak leaders of any real authority in that country. In fact, as we have seen, the separatists' ambitions were in fundamental conflict with the interests of the large Russian population in these territories. This population included not only the Russian peasants but all the workers on railways and other communications, and also in the mines and factories.

The following passage,[1] written with special reference to the then situation in Bashkiria, is of wider application. It demonstrates what were the real motives impelling the Soviets to act in a manner precisely contrary to the professions of their 1917 Declaration to the Muslim peoples of Russia.

Most Soviet organs in the Urals were predominantly Great Russian in their ethnic make-up because their personnel consisted largely of industrial workers, soldiers of the garrisons, and peasants, none of which existed among the Moslems in any sizeable numbers.

[1] Ibid. II, 8, R. E. Pipes.

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> The Bashkirs . . . had no proletariat . . . only a small part of them engaged in settled agricultural pursuits. Hence it is not surprising that the various Soviets were predominantly Russian and came to fight for specifically Russian interests. That meant that local Soviet institutions took the side of Russian colonists in their struggle for land with the Bashkir peasantry. Bashkirs were in many cases prevented from joining local Soviets.

The writer goes on to quote the central Soviet delegate to Bashkiria as having admitted, perhaps ironically, that, despite their best intentions, the Bolsheviks at that time simply spearheaded the onslaught of the Russian Kulaks on Bashkurd lands. They incited the colonists against the indigenous peoples, armed them, and saw to it that only they should benefit from food distribution measures taken to combat the famine.

This state of affairs enabled the Kremlin to put any convenient gloss it wished on its announcements in favour of local autonomy, self-determination or even secession. Thus Stalin could later claim that the nationality policy was to be national in its outward form but proletarian in its inner substance,[1] and justify the exclusion of an indigenous population lacking a proletariat not only from participation in the organs of supreme revolutionary power but even from the management of its own local affairs. And this, in fact, is what he said and subsequently did. Adjustments were made from time to time to appease national leaders who seemed in the Kremlin to dispose of a temporary power deserving of some respect; but when all was prepared and the base secure, both the will and the force were made available to overthrow them. That is roughly what happened, first in Kokand, later in Bashkiria, and finally, when the time was ripe, in Khiva and Bukhara too. It is what happened in the Caucasus. Further, not only was Moscow, in common with the Whites, determined to uphold Russian colonial interests in Asia; both blocked and frustrated every effort by the Bashkurds, Kazaks and leaders of southern Turkistan to get together with a view

[1] Bib. I, 90, p. 210.

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to forming a unified State. Both Reds and Whites regarded every such step as in the nature of a pan-Islamic or pan-Turkic alliance to which they were extremely hostile. In the end the autonomous local government of Bashkiria was destroyed by the infiltration of agents of the central Party who organized cells among the Russian population. The method adopted was to place in the hands of the local Party bosses the sole authority for the alleviation of the terrible starvation and disease which had followed the famine and was decimating the peoples of the area. The authority of the Bashrevcom was undermined until, with their army absent fighting the Whites and the Poles in the West, they began to lose even the semblance of a government.

In May 1920 Moscow published a new decree to regulate the autonomy of Bashkiria. This withdrew most of the powers delegated a year before, subordinating all subjects of importance, political, financial and economic, to the Centre. The Bashkurd leaders decided on one final effort, and adopted a strongly worded protest of which the main interest is that it is the earliest realization by the victims that the Soviets were determined, in their own way and time, to work for a Russian hegemony over other peoples. At that time (1920) this reality had not appeared from behind the mask of fair-seeming Soviet platitude lauding such aims as 'Asia for the Asians' or 'Freedom for the Peoples of Islam' — aims which today would be dismissed as mere bourgeois-nationalism. But the Bashkurd leaders, even then, had seen behind the façade. They charged the Party in general, and Stalin in particular, with having embarked upon a course of out-and-out Great Russian chauvinism.

Togan went to Moscow in May 1920 to see what he could do. Stalin and Kamenev sent him a message to come and spend some time with the Bashkurd troops fighting the Poles on the Ukraine front, Stalin hinting that the difficulties were all due to Trotsky into whose mouth he put the opinion that the rise of Togan's influence on the Asiatic front was dangerous to Soviet Russia. Togan was loth to go, remarking that Stalin

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was only putting his own opinion into the mouth of Trotsky, whom he disliked. Lenin, however, ordered him to comply, and a few days later he met Stalin in the south. What follows is best told in Togan's own words:[1]

> I met Stalin near the Crimea at Kremenchuk, where towards evening our carriages were hooked onto his private train. We had long conversations together both on a motor drive at Kremenchuk and in the train. He was very friendly, and it seemed as if his heart burned for the Eastern Turks, for us small nations. He threw all the blame on Trotsky, whom he described as one who cared nothing for nationalists. He himself, he said, was the son of a Georgian nationalist; that was why he understood us so well. He abused the Russians for their chauvinism, but told me — as had Lenin a few days before — I ought to do my duty in the spirit of Great Russia and not worry so much about governing a small tribe. I was obliged to remind myself that this man, with whom I had talked for so long at table in the Tsar's ornate railway carriage, was in no wise to be trusted, and that, despite all his fair and partly reasonable words, no good was to be expected from him or from the Russian Communist Party which he even then controlled.

Togan was admitted also to more than one personal conversation with Lenin himself. A debate was proceeding in Moscow at the time regarding what was then still called the colonial question, and Lenin sent him the draft of a thesis on 'Nationalities and Colonial Problems', asking him to put down observations in writing on twelve theses which he — Lenin — had set forth. On one of these points Togan advised the despatch of a High Commission to Turkistan to be composed of three Russians and three Muslims — a conservative proportion, given the tone of the November Declaration. Lenin accepted this and made the Muslim appointments, only a little later to withdraw the names and substitute Russians, of whom Kuibishev was one. There could hardly have been a clearer departure from the spirit of the Declaration. Again, as so often with Communist papers, Lenin's draft proceeded on certain *ex cathedra* assumptions which set 'the proletariat' at the head of the pluses, and the 'small bourgeoisie' at the

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 400.

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bottom of the minuses as a class which had nothing to expect. Togan demanded a clear definition of both phrases, enquiring pertinently how far each term, as used, cut across nationalities. Lenin found the question an awkward one, but advanced the thesis that 'the colonies' only trusted representatives of the Russian proletariat and this would be the case in future. National leaders in those regions would command trust only in so far as they remained faithful and obedient to the proletariat of the ruling nation. Lenin even advanced the personal opinion that, after the victory of the Social Revolution throughout the world, the Colonial nations in the East must be guided by the workers of the ruling nations of Europe, by which he meant Russia, France and England. During the process of socialization the workers of the native populations must be regarded as *in statu pupillari* only.

There remains one final account of a conversation between Lenin and Togan, which must be related in the latter's own words:[1]

> I have just [he writes] tuned in to Moscow radio, and the first sentence I heard was to the effect that loyalty in our time is a stupid quality. Twenty-one years ago, when a dispute between ourselves and Moscow was being discussed I wanted to gather information regarding a clause in the treaty between the two States. I had approached Lenin, who, without mincing words, said that a treaty was simply a piece of paper. When I said that in our country we were used to keeping promises according to the tradition of our ancestors, he replied, 'Then your ancestors must have been stupid. I took you for a revolutionary. Look at the real facts, not at a piece of paper.'

Even then the period had passed when Liberalism served as a vehicle for Communist propaganda, and a screen for Communist intentions. Lenin's words, spoken in 1917, are the more haunting:

> We want a voluntary union of nations — a union which would permit of no oppression of one nation by another — such a union as would be based on the most complete confidence,

[1] From Togan's fascicule written in 1940.

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175 on a clear understanding of fraternal unity, on entirely voluntary
669 consent.

563 The Bashkurd leaders realized what had happened and dispersed to organize resistance elsewhere. In Bashkiria the rest of 1920 was passed in Civil War. Under cover of suppression of a counter-revolutionary rising there began a reign of terror, forcing the Bashkurds into the mountains, where they were killed off by Red troops raised from Russian colonists, or succumbed to the rigours of a severe winter. Removed from those events we can now see that what really happened was the stimulation by revolutionary passions of the national emotions of Russian and Turk alike, with the result that revolutionary action took the form of a national and not a class struggle. The contest between nomad and colonist was inevitably expressed as a clash between Turk and Russian. In this struggle the Turks were doomed to failure, not only because Russia as Russia was strong, but because these Turks were nomads and their social and economic structure gave them no part in Communist cells, composed of soldiers, peasants and industrial labourers.

Togan disappeared. One morning in July 1920, in the disguise of Red Army uniform and on pretext of going to Astrakhan on leave, he disappeared and made his way to Baku. From Baku he crossed the Caspian to the Turkmen country and succeeded in winning through to Bukhara. But before he reached safety he addressed a letter as a parting shot to Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky.[1]

> We see [he wrote] you accept the ideas of genuine national Russian chauvinism as the basis of your policy. Everything has turned out as the true Russians wished it. Frunze [the Red General, whose name was later given to Pishpek, the capital of Kirghizia] and Kuibishev, who head the Turkistan Commission, have said openly that at all its meetings a hypocritical policy has been pursued against the native Turkish Communists, and that cooperation with us has been a pure pretence. . . . Another member of this Commission said that class must be deliberately set against class among

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 403.

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the native population, by representing the nationalists to be the enemies of the working-class and due for extirpation. But you should realize we mean to give you no opportunity to make us out to be class enemies of the proletariat. You will find plenty to sacrifice, but we are not the men to offer ourselves blindly to sacrifice. The Comintern leaders, Zinoviev and Radek, have treated the representatives of the eastern nations like anti-revolutionary peasants . . . you choose to assume that the most essential problem in the east is the land question, and that the class war in the east rests on that question. You are about to revive the class-war by terrorist means. But we have clearly explained in our reply to the thesis written by Comrade Lenin on colonial problems that the land question in the east has in principle produced no class distinction [between us]. For in the east it is the European Russians, whether capitalists or workers, who are the top class, while the people of the soil [*yerli*], rich or poor, are their slaves. Why should there be any distinction of class between those who have the land cultivated and those who do the work? You will go on finding class enemies of the workers, and rooting them out until every educated man among the native population [*yerli*] has been removed and there are only left the peasants who know only about asses, oxen and spades.

In other words, as he might have added, do you, Comrades Lenin and Stalin, till the land?

To grasp that these words were written to the Soviet leaders as early as 1920 is to realize that the Turks of Central Asia could throw up men of no usual penetration. And they were now to receive a new inspiration, combining the old and the new pattern of Turkish native endeavour.

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and multiplicity of aims and counsels forbade cohesion. But there was a man from outside who went near to command success when native talent failed.

669 An interesting and obscure part of the history of the Turkistan interregnum between the fall of Tsardom and the establishment of Soviet power is to be found in the dramatic intervention of the Western Turkish Pashas, Jemal and Enver. These were two of the Istanbul triumvirate which brought Turkey into her declaration of war on Germany's side in 1914 and thereafter led her through the bad years to the final defeat of 1918. Enver's exploits in the field had been gallant though of a somewhat Pyrrhic nature. On the Caucasus front, and particularly at Sarikamish, he won personal renown but lost an army. Jemal is well known for his ruthless direction of the war against the Arabs on the southern front. With Turkey's defeat at the end of 1918 neither man felt he had much to look for in his own country, and both gravitated towards the Bolsheviks who, as we know, were playing up a sympathy with 'down-trodden Muslim peoples'. And both Jemal and Enver probably felt that an alliance of this sort offered them the best hope of revenge on a Britain whose conquering arms had finally succeeded in breaking Turkey after so long a fight.

Jemal reached Tashkent from Moscow in August 1920, a few months before Togan's arrival. Both he and his successor Enver were sponsored by the Bolsheviks, who wished to use the war-born resentment of these Turkish leaders against the British conqueror of Turkey to stir up further trouble for Britain in Afghanistan and so keep her anxious for her own possessions in India. It was the policy of Tsarist Russia, noted by Curzon, to keep England engaged in Asia with a view to offsetting any movement by her against Russia in Europe. There may also have been some hope of diverting Eastern Turkish nationalism away from grievances against Russia, and starting it on the barren road of Islamic enthusiasm against the

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British in India across the mountains. But, as the event 669 showed, the last thing Lenin wanted was a focus of nationalism in Turkistan itself.

Jemal, committed and with passion to this objective, went on to the Afghan capital, Kabul, to start what he called an Islamic Revolutionary League, whose object was to be the freeing of India from British domination. He talked at first of organizing armies in Afghanistan to seize the Panjab. (The short-lived Anglo-Afghan war of 1919 was just over, and difficult negotiations were in train for a peace settlement.) Later the Kremlin, who had agreed to his opening negotiations with the Basmachis, suspected him of a too effective organization of the rebels as a fighting force with the help of Turkish officers. What they wanted was to get the Basmachis into their bag. Jemal also negotiated ineffectively with the Bukhara National Union, but the negotiations broke on the latter's demand that he renounce all idea of using Turkistan as a base for freeing India, and concentrate on strengthening their organizations to enable them to bargain effectively with the Russians for their freedom. Jemal would not go so far, but Lenin suspected him of playing a double game and recalled him in October 1921. He was a bitter, cruel man who had failed in all he sought to do, and what he did he did without a generous gesture. He was murdered at Tiflis on 21st July 1922, probably at Bolshevik instigation.

Enver arrived at Bukhara on Jemal's heels in the same month of October. He too came under Russian auspices. His aim, as announced, was the same as that which Jemal had failed to reach — alliance with Bolshevism in the fight for Islamic ideals against the so-called Imperialism. But his own real object, confided to the National Union shortly after his arrival, was to mobilize Eastern Turkish resistance, and particularly the Basmachis, against the Soviets, and so set up an independent State in Central Asia. At first the National Union leaders strenuously endeavoured to dissuade him, pointing to the famine conditions still ruling, but at heart swayed by their belief that the time was inopportune for

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669 anything but conspiratorial measures.

After some hesitation, Enver decided that his Turkish patriotism demanded of him a bold move in an endeavour to do just what the Bukhara leaders could not do — unite the Union Party, the intelligentsia, with the partisans, the Basmachis. Togan gives a moving description of Enver's last night in Bukhara, sitting cross-legged on the floor in his uncomfortable Turkish uniform, and making his decision as a *mūjahit*,[1] with tears in his eyes, feeling he was in the cradle of the Turkish race. Next morning Enver rode off with twenty-four companions, saying:

> I have decided I must go to eastern Bukhara. If we succeed we shall be *ghaziz* [victors for the faith]; otherwise we fall *shehits* [martyrs] on the battle-field. We must fight for Turkistan. Did we fear death ordained by fate, and choose the life of a dog, we should merit the curse of our ancestors and our descendants. But if we can bear to die for freedom, we shall have ensured the freedom and happiness of those who follow us.[2]

He rode first to Ibrahim Beg Lakai, of the Emir's party of Basmachis. Ibrahim, loyal to his Emir, held Enver captive as the man who had broken the power of the Ottoman Sultan and started the Young Turk movement. After many vicissitudes Enver succeeded in capturing the tribal imagination and, having secured his freedom, united a large number of tribesmen around him, under the leadership of Devletmand, the most chivalrous of the hill chiefs. He had also some notable Afghan adherents and a devoted Russian Cossack aide named Rayev. His forces, and he himself, gave an excellent account of themselves for some months, and caused the Soviet commanders much disquiet. He had achieved for the moment the impossible, infusing the new ideas and the old with a common enthusiasm. But it was not to last. After some successes, in August 1922 he was forced to retire on Beljuvan in the Tajik hills supported only by the faithful Devletmand and his partisans.

On 8th August Enver died gloriously. Early in the

[1] Islamic equivalent of a Crusader.

[2] Togan, *op. cit.* pp. 437 *et seqq.*

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morning he had heard that a detachment of 300 Russians was approaching a hill above Beljuvan. Without waiting for the rest of his soldiers to collect, he rode against the enemy with 25 men, reaching the top of the hill at the same moment as the Russians mounted it on the other side. Taking advantage of surprise, he succeeded in disarming a body 75 strong, and again advanced with drawn sword against the remainder, thrown into confusion by his onslaught. With him were 5 men only, the Turk Cherkes Hussein, the Kazanli Kerim, Enver's Afghan groom, the Cossack Rayev and the Kazak Ishmurad. The other soldiers under Devletmand were now coming on the scene, but fortune was against a reckless man, as it had been earlier on the Caucasian front by Sarikamish. A Russian machine-gun opened up from a flank and shot the Pasha through the heart. The gallant Devletmand, coming up in support, was killed a minute later. The Russians retired not realizing their triumph.[1]

Twenty thousand of the tribesmen around gathered weeping to Enver's funeral; many kissed the dead man's hands and feet, and took hairs from his beard in memory. A lament ran through the land, and his death was celebrated in a famous poem of the Uzbeks. In calmer moments Togan says that he was not Enver's man, and their views on political means and ends were widely different. He condemns Enver too for posing as a redeemer with a mission beyond his strength to unite the resistance movement. But the contemplation of a warrior who of his own will has made the final sacrifice moves the historian beyond measure, and he ends by acclaiming him as the hero of an epic which will resound so long as Turks are Turks. He calls him a great idealist, who ignored daily life and facts.

He had little knowledge of the geography or the statistics of Turkistan. In Bismarck's words, politics is the art of the possible. Yet by his death Enver redeemed all; he has become a legend and

[1] The account of Enver's death largely follows *Bugünkü Türkili*, pp. 451-60. It is drawn partly from the memoirs of one Mustafa Shahkul, one of Enver's advisers in Bukhara.

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669 a memory, even among the very men who would have fought against him in his time. All who knew him acclaim him a great man, a pure man, a man beyond the common measure.

He appears indeed in the story as a sort of Young Pretender, a hero for Turkistan to acclaim as was Shamil for the Caucasus, the embodied pattern in these latter days of Turkish heroism and ideals.

Among the tribes support for Enver came from the recognition that he stood for that ancient ideal of Turkish chivalry, and the intellectuals believed in him because, with all this, he had proved himself an innovator[1].

The chronicle proceeds:

> Enver was before his time, yet his death sowed a seed. I said to him at Bukhara 'we are not ready for it yet'. Enver replied: 'And it will be some time before you are ready for it'. And he was right. Many years have now gone by since we first laid the charge that is to explode when Russia's internal and external situation becomes difficult, and we see it is not yet ready to go off. If Enver Pasha had taken no part in developments in Turkistan, the rising would have faded without memory; he gave it a new form, a new significance.
>
> Nor did he really dream of pan-Islamism or even of pan-Turanism. He considered indeed that the interests of the Turks in western and central Asia were identical, and that it was the duty of clear-thinking men to make known in Turkistan the reality of such interests. But he said to me at Bukhara: 'Osmanli will never become the common language of Turkistan: a native Chaghatai must be invented. This has become obvious to me since, having been in Russia, I have come to Turkistan.' He himself never expected his movement at that time to succeed, so he adopted the watchword — Victory or death in the field. By his death on Turkistan soil he offered the supreme sacrifice for that country and for the history of the Turks.

∞∞ In Britain, the exploits of Enver Pasha have won no renown: he was our bitter enemy in World War I, and he met his death far away, in a period of confusion which we have never tried to understand. So far as there existed knowledge at that time, his exploits beyond the Oxus caused anxiety in India, and there was a tendency to echo the Soviets and cry

[1] [See pp. 101, 119 cf. 116 -- Analyst]

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him down as a mere adventurer. But it is not the habit of Englishmen to withhold honour from a gallant foe. Enver was a good loser. And to many Turks, it seems, he remains a national hero, who brought about the revolution in Turkey and played a noble part in Central Asia. A Turkish historian of today has compared him with the Seljuk Kilich Arslan, who smote the Crusaders. To such men Enver ranks among the Deli Dumrul — the epic heroes — of the Turks.

The Basmachi rebellion was officially stated to have ended in 1924, but it did not die with Enver. In fact his death supplied just the impulse needed to bring the varied elements of the resistance together. The embers of the revolt smouldered on, supported from across the border in Afghan Turkistan, until the Afghan revolution in 1928[1] gave the Soviets a chance of intervention across the border during the interregnum. It was not until 1931 that Ibrahim Beg was finally captured, and there was evidence which filtered through of rebel movements in Soviet Turkistan much later than this.

The spirit which animated this struggle comes out in the story of Khan Junaid of Khiva, a gallant old man, who had fought the Russians steadily since 1873, when they captured that city. Ever since then he had refused to take Russian citizenship, and had been the Khan's chief minister more than once. In 1920, disgusted with the failure of the Bolsheviks to live up to their professions, he took up arms again, and continued to raid lines of communication until 1927, when he concluded peace on the terms that he would be left alone to farm his land near Urgench. Finding the Soviets were still after him, he withdrew once more into outlawry and fought on until 1929, when he was forced across the frontier into Afghanistan. It is now high treason for any admirer even to refer to Khan Junaid. Or there is Haji Sami, the Turk on whom Enver's mantle fell, a hard determined man who, unlike

[1] The abdication of Amanullah and accession of Nadir Shah after a short usurpation by Bacha Sakao.

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669 Enver, hanged traitors. He took Ibrahim Beg prisoner and compelled him to serve the cause, and found a way to make the intellectuals and the tribal fighters join together in the campaign. For many months he carried on with the utmost resolution in Karategin and around Farghana. When at last he was driven across the frontier into Afghanistan, Togan reproached him, saying he had been too confident when Enver was still alive, and had now lost heart. The answer was full of dignity: 'My heart is with me, but I am wounded and cannot ride'.

000 Togan has much to say of the crowded and confused events in Central Asia that followed the Russian revolution, but the proudest and the newest message he has to offer is to be found in his assessment of the historic significance of the Basmachi movement. In his account of it he rises from the ranks of the chroniclers to become the writer of a drama, almost a prophet; the style of his narration changes like that of Thucydides when he puts speeches into the mouths of his statesmen and generals, and he seems inspired. If this Basmachi struggle was indeed a real epic, it will still stir the hearts of the descendants of those who took part in it just as it moves him. It is represented as a great national impulse, which for years
669 absorbed all the forces capable of playing an active part. It was joined not only by men who had taken part in the Merdikar rising of 1916, but by those who had been with Dükchi Ishan in 1898 and old men who had fought against the Chinese in Kashghar. It mobilized the tribes, Uzbek, Kirghiz and Kazak, the young intellectuals of the cities, West Turk officers, many Afghans and Enver Pasha. Since the days of Shaibani Khan in the XVIth century there had been no national movement in Turkistan to compare with it. The movement had of course its negative side, for the need to meet the rebels on their own ground had forced the Russians to penetrate far into the mountains of eastern Bukhara and along the Chinese and Afghan frontiers, but this would have followed in time without any struggle. The Russian press professed to lament the losses caused to the rebels in battle, which they said had led

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to a large diminution in the population. But such losses were 669 as nothing to the systematic mass-murder which inevitably followed if a revolting population was forced to throw itself on Soviet mercy. Only a few thousands fell in battle in Farghana, and only a few hundred in Bashkiria, but when the Bashkurds submitted in 1921 they were subjected to artificial famine and disease, their lands were handed to Russians and they themselves were forced into the mountains or the steppe after seizure of their flocks, with the result that they died in hundreds upon hundreds of thousands. The Soviets in fact adopted the Roman process; it was their peace which made a solitude and was more deadly than their war.

Of his own part, and the emotions to which the struggle 000 gave rise, he speaks feelingly. In 1923 the hope of organized resistance was over and with a few friends he was crossing the Hindu Kush on his way to Kabul. As the little party mounted the foothills of the great rampart, they looked back sadly to the vast plains of the Turanian land stretched out beneath them and thought of the last six years since the Kerensky revolution, of all the effort which had been expended, and of the lives lost and the dreariness of the opening prospect. For six years they had ridden up and down that great land and calculated they had put perhaps 7000 miles behind them. But was all that endeavour in vain? Let him speak for himself.[1]

It is my delight that I was privileged to share in the severest struggles of my people in real earnest and not as a looker-on, even if that part had no historic significance. Everywhere we went we had seen the untold misery, the great-hearted uprightness, the saintliness of soul of our people. With our own eyes we beheld the things that travellers write about, and we exposed the lies told of the morale and character of the Turks. We observed the characteristics described as pacifist and cowardly, and knew these to be really the expression of the cool blood of a thoughtful, enduring and incredibly patient people, and also of a kind of wonder when face to face with the strange civilization the Russians had brought with them. Among the nomad and tribal Uzbeks and Kirghiz the old spirit of leadership, the master-soul, the true

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 472-4.